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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the burden of proving the defamatory mean-
ing through extrinsic facts; but when such
defamatory meaning is established, a pre-
sumption, rebuttable by the broadcaster,
that the plaintiff was injured might arise.
This would avoid imposing upon the plain-
tiff the almost impossible burden of proving
special damages and yet, would provide the
broadcaster with an opportunity to prove
that the extrinsic facts were not widely




Defendant was convicted of publishing
books which contained no imprint of his
name or the printer's name as required by
the New York General Business Law. Sec-
tion 330, Subdivision 2, provides that
"every ... publication printed or reprinted
... and published in this state shall con-
spicuously have imprinted on the cover,
title, or copyright page or at the end of the
publication the true name and address of
the publisher or printer." Section 331 makes
a failure to carry out the provisions of the
preceding section a misdemeanor. The
Appellate Division reversed the conviction,
holding the statute void on its face as an
unconstitutional interference with the right
of free speech. People v. Mishkin, 17 App.
Div. 2d 243, 234 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1st Dep't
1962) (per curiam).
The freedoms of speech and press are
secured against federal infringement by the
first amendment and are protected from
abridgement by state action through the
damaged or that his damages were negli-
gible.
Whatever rule a court may adopt con-
cerning damages, it would appear that, in
the public interest and in the light of modem
communication, a court should rule either
that all defamatory broadcasts are action-
able per se or that, where a defamatory
broadcast is defamatory only through ex-
trinsic facts, a rebuttable presumption
should arise that a plaintiff has been injured.
fourteenth amendment.' These freedoms are
not absolute and unlimited. 2 Certain types
of speech such as obscenity and defamation
have been held to be beyond constitutional
protection. 3 These freedoms are among
those which are acknowledged as having a
"preferred position" in relation to other
constitutional freedoms,4 although some
dissent has been voiced as to the validity of
this concept when "it carries the thought...
that any law touching communication is
infected with presumptive invalidity."'
I See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707
(1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
2 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
371 (1927); Giflow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666-68 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
3 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952) (libel); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
4 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
(1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30
(1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
115 (1943).
5 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949).
Therefore, a statute or ordinance seeking to
limit or restrict freedom of speech or press
under the state's power to protect the pub-
lic health, safety and welfare must be en-
gendered by a "clear and present danger"
and justified by a compelling public interest
in combating a substantial evil.' Further-
more, except in highly unusual circum-
stances,' these freedoms are favored in that
no expression, damaging as it may be, can
be prohibited in advance of its utterance,
though of course such utterance may be
subsequently penalized.8
It is well established that handbills, books
and other printed literature fall within the
general protection given to the freedoms.9
The regulation of handbill distribution by
municipal governments has presented diffi-
culties for both legislative bodies and courts
for many years."' It was not until the late
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, discussed the
historical development of the concept of "pre-
ferred freedoms," deploring the "ways of mechani-
cal jurisprudence through the use of oversimplified
formulas." Id. at 96.
6 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 513
(1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919).
7Near v. Minnesota, supra note 1, at 715-16
(obstruction of recruiting service; advocating re-
bellion in wartime; publication of troop sailing
dates in wartime).
Id. at 713-23.
9 "The liberty of the press is not confined... in
its historic connotation [and] comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion." Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
10 Municipal governments have reacted to the
handbill probem in various ways. Though some
ordinances are concerned with size and content,
the most common area of regulation involves dis-
tribution, e.g., the ordinance may either com-
pletely or partially prohibit handbill distribution,
or it may prescribe various limitations, such as the
licensing of the distribution. In sustaining many
of the early ordinances, the courts concluded that
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1930's however, when the Supreme Court
decided the case of Lovell v. City of Grif-
fin," that any significant blow was dealt to
the thousands of municipalities attempting
to regulate, or completely proscribe, hand-
bill distribution. The city of Griffin, Geor-
gia, had enacted an ordinance prohibiting
the distribution of any type of handbill
within the city without the permission of
the city manager. A unanimous Court held
the ordinance void on its face since it vio-
lated the rights of free speech and press by
subjecting the handbill to prior licensing
and censorship. Although the opinion in the
Griffin case seemed broad and clear, the
rule set down by the Court was emasculated
by several state courts,' 2 which subsequently
upheld similar handbill ordinances, restrict-
ing the Griffin case to a narrow interpreta-
tion. The doubt raised by these conflicting
decisions was short-lived when the Supreme
Court, in Schneider v. State,13 overruled
these state decisions. Efforts were made to
distinguish these ordinances from the one
held void in the Griffin case.' 4 The chief
grounds urged for distinction were that the
handbills were an annoyance to the public, a
health and safety menace, a vehicle for fraud and
other criminal activities, a possible stimulus for
breaches of the peace, and that they imposed a
heavy financial burden on the municipality respon-
sible for keeping the streets free from litter. For
an analysis of the early ordinances and the litiga-
tion they precipitated, see Lindsay, Council and
Court: The Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939, 39
MICH. L. REv. 561 (1941).
'1 303 U.S. 444 (1937).
l-People v. Young, 33 Cal. App. 747, 85 P.2d 231
(Super. Ct. 1938); Commonwealth v. Nichols,
301 Mass. 584, 18 N.E.2d 166 (1938); Town of
Irvington v. Schneider, 121 N.J.L. 542, 3 A.2d
609 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939); Milwaukee v. Snyder,
230 Wis. 131, 283 N.W. 301 (1939).
13 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
1.1 Lovell v. Griffin, supra note 9.
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ordinances had been passed to prevent
either frauds, disorder or littering, and that
two of the ordinances applied only to cer-
tain city areas. 15 The Court held that al-
though the various ordinances involved
were of somewhat narrower scope than that
in the Griffin case, nevertheless handbill dis-
tribution on public streets, without prior
discretionary licensing requirement, was
implicit in the right of free speech. The
Court pointed out that where legislative
abridgments of the right are asserted, the
court should be astute to examine the effect
of the challenged legislation.
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs re-
specting matters of public convenience may
well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to
justify such as diminishes the exercise of
rights so vital to the maintenance of demo-
cratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the
delicate and difficult tasks falls upon the
courts to weigh the circumstances and to
appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the
free enjoyment of the rights.16
The Court further pointed out that there
were other ways to accomplish these legiti-
mate aims without abridging freedom of
speech and press.
The decision in Martin v. City of Struth-
ers 7 clearly pointed out how far the Court
would go in safeguarding the right of free
15 The ordinance in the Schneider case covered
both handbill distribution and canvassing and
vested inquisitorial power in the chief of police
who had to satisfy himself of the good character
of the applicant and the bona fides of the cause he
professed before a permit would be issued. The
ordinances in the Young, Nichols and Snyder cases
restricted handbill distribution on public streets
and were more closely related to the problem of
littering.
16 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
dissemination of ideas against the conflicting
interest of local governments in protecting
their citizens from annoyance. In that case,
the ordinance forbade the ringing of door-
bells in order to summon the occupant of a
residence to the door to receive a handbill.
The city attempted to counter the free
speech attack by showing that many of its
residents were employed at night and that
constant doorbell ringing would disturb
their rest. Also, since criminals often posed
as house-to-house canvassers, a prohibitory
ordinance would clearly aid in crime pre-
vention. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the
majority, pointed out that the dangers im-
plicit in allowing free handbill distribution
could be controlled by other legal methods
which would not restrict the fullest enjoy-
ment of free speech. The test formulated
was that the exercise of the right will be
susceptible to restraint only when the grav-
ity of the evil to be averted, discounted by
the improbability of its occurence, justifies
it.' s Implicit in that test is the further qual-
ification that, though the public interest be
substantial, the statute designed to safe-
guard that interest should not be so broad
as to unnecessarily restrict speech which is
not within the objectional class.is
In the leading case of Talley v. Califor-
nia,-' which was the primary authority in
the instant case, the Supreme Court found
the prerequisite of disclosure of authorship
to be the equivalent of a general prohibi-
tion, thus uniting the heretofore distinct
lines of decision concerning handbill distri-
bution and the right to anonymity. The
17 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
18 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510
(1951).
19 See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450-51 (1938).
20 362 U.S. 60 (1960),
right to remain anonymous as part of the
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment has
had but a short history before the Supreme
Court. In New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zim-
merman,
21 a New York statute22 which re-
quired registration and disclosure of the
names of all members of organizations re-
quiring an oath as a prerequisite for mem-
bership was upheld. In requiring that the
Ku-Klux Klan submit membership lists, the
Court held that in view of the violent and
unlawful activity of the Klan, the legislature
had acted properly. NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson23 in 1958, was the first deci-
sion in which the right to remain anonymous
was upheld. That case and Bates v. City of
Little Rock24 both struck down state at-
tempts to require public identification of
the membership of the NAACP. In both
cases the petitioners attacked the applica-
tion of the disclosure requirements by show-
ing that the effect would be restraint upon
their exercise of free association because
of threats of economic and even physical
reprisals. 25
In the NAACP case,2" Alabama brought
suit to oust the NAACP from the state be-
cause of its failure to comply with a statute
27
requiring foreign corporations to qualify
before doing business in the state. The state
secured a court order requiring the produc-
tion of certain records, including the names
of all Alabama members, alleging that the
records were necessary to answer the
21 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
22 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 53.
23 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
24 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
251d. at 523-24; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
26 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, supra
note 25.
27 ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 192-98 (1940).
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NAACP's denial that it was conducting
intrastate business. The Supreme Court held
that compelled disclosure of the member-
ship lists was so related to an individual
member's right to freedom of association
and such a deterrent to the perfectly peace-
ful discussion of public matters of impor-
tance as to be violative of the fourteenth
amendment. The state's asserted purpose in
requiring the disclosure was held not to
justify the deterrent effect on free associ-
ation, since there was no relevant correla-
tion between the names of members and
the conduct of intrastate business within
the meaning of the statute.
The decision in Bates28 was based square-
ly on the NAACP case. There, the custodian
of the local NAACP branch refused to pro-
duce the names of all local members as
required by a city license tax ordinance.
Here again, no compelling justification was
found for the deterrence of free association
which disclosure of the membership lists
would cause.
The Talley decision29 extends the protec-
tion of anonymity from the field of associa-
tion generally to that of a specific utterance.
This presents no conceptual difficulties, for
once the necessity for such protection is ac-
cepted, there can be little doubt that it
applies equally to both situations. s° Fear of
retaliation can be just as effective a deterrent
28Bates v.. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960).
29 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
30 The most often advanced rationale for protec-
tion of anonymous speech as a necessary corollary
to the constitutional right of free speech is based
on the proposition that it is the unpopular idea
that needs protection. See CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 1-36 (1948).
Where there is danger of retaliation against the
advocate of the unpopular idea, his right to speak
is invaded by a requirement that he acknowledge
NOTES AND COMMENTS
to an individual author as to a member of an
unpopular association. In the Talley case, a
Los Angeles city ordinance' prohibited the
distribution of any handbill not carrying
upon its face the name and address of the
person printing and distributing it. The Su-
preme Court reversed a conviction under
this ordinance, holding it void on its face as
an abridgement of freedom of speech and
press. The Court based its decision partially
upon prior cases invalidating ordinances
which prohibited the distribution of hand-
bills without licenses3 2 or which prohibited
any public distribution of handbills. 3 In
finding that the ordinance imposed a restric-
tion upon free speech in the same manner as
excessively broad statutes banning publica-
tion or imposing prior restraint, the Court
recognized that freedom from public identi-
fication is essential to free speech. This is
apparent from the fact that identification
was the only requirement imposed by the
ordinance. The holding was specifically re-
stricted to the broad ordinance at issue,
leaving open the question of a statute limited
in its application to the specific evil which
it was designed to suppress.2 4
In the instant case, the New York court
authorship. This is due to the deterrent effect of
the possible threat of retaliation which a require-
ment of disclosure facilitates. For a comprehensive
study of "the right to association," see 4 RACE
REL. L. REP. 207 (1959).
31Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 28.06:
"No person shall distribute any hand-bill in any
place under any circumstances, which does not
have printed on the cover, or the face thereof,
the name and address of the following: (a) The
person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufac-
tured the same, (b) The person who caused the
same to be distributed .. "
32 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
33 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
3a Talley v. California, supra note 29, at 64.
struck down a statute similar to that in the
Talley case. Here, the statute required dis-
closure of the name and address of the pub-
lisher or printer of every publication printed
in the state. The Appellate Division indi-
cated that before a state can require such a
disclosure, some grounds for the restriction
of free expression must either be found in
the statute or be otherwise established. No
such grounds appeared in the statute.3 5 This
holding was also specifically restricted to the
broad statute at issue.
Statutes restricting the right to remain
anonymous are not uncommon. Examples
of such restrictions may be found in state 6
and federal37 regulation of distribution of
election campaign materials, and in federal
statutes requiring the labeling of mail and
identification of broadcasts of Communist
organizations." The Supreme Court has up-
35 The District Attorney suggested that the statute
might be found constitutional if its application
were limited to obscene publications, for there
would be a justifiable purpose in facilitating the
discovery of the publisher. The Court rejected this
contention, stating that the statute itself is not so
limited and that there was nothing to indicate that
this was the legislative intent. People v. Mishkin,
17 App. Div. 2d 243, 244, 234 N.Y.S.2d 342, 343-
44 (1st Dep't 1962). However, it appears that this
was precisely the legislative intent. The bill was
introduced at the request of the joint legislative
committee to study the publication of and dissem-
ination of offensive and obscene material. N.Y.
SESS. LAWS 1956, Ch. 945, § 3; N.Y. LEG. ANN.
48-49 (1956). Cf. the Report of the Joint Legisla-
tive Committee to Study the Publication of Com-
ics, N.Y. LEG. ANN. 137-38 (1955).
36See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § 781-b. The consti-
tutionality of state election laws has been upheld
by several state courts. State v. Freeman, 143 Kan.
315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936); State v. Babst, 104 Ohio
St. 167, 135 N.E. 525 (1922); Commonwealth v.
Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A.2d 137 (1944).
.37 62 Stat. 724 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.
§ 612 (1958).
38 64 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 789 (1959).
held a provision of the Federal Post Office
Appropriation Act '1 requiring, as a condi-
tion precedent to the entering of newspapers
as second-class matter in the mails, that the
names and addresses of the editors of the
paper and other information be disclosed.
The rationale behind this decision, 40 how-
ever, is that the low postal rates given to
second-class mail constitute a privilege
granted by the federal government, and as
such, are subject to regulation. Likewise,
the requirement of the Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act"' that a lobbyist register
and give the names and addresses of the
persons who sponsor him has been recon-
ciled with the freedom of speech and press,
as a valid method of securing a vital national
interest. The validity of this statute was up-
held in United States v. Harriss,4 2 where the
Court held that Congress has sufficient in-
terest in protecting itself from having the
voice of the public drowned out by special
interest groups to pass such regulations. It
should be noted that the legislation chal-
lenged in each of these cases was motivated
by a substantial governmental interest which
was to be protected, and further, that each
had application only to expression of the
class which was deemed to be a threat to that
interest.
Although the rationale of the opinions in
The act was held valid in Communist Party of the
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
'937 Stat. 553, 554 (1912), as amended, 39
U.S.C. § 233 (1959).
40 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288,
308 (1913).
41 60 Stat. 839-42 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 26-70
(1959).
4'-'347 U.S. 612 (1954).
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the instant 4 1 and Talley44 cases is unclear,
several modes of analysis, each with a vary-
ing degree of plausibility, are presented. In
concluding that the Talley case fell precisely
under the ban of prior decisions that pro-
hibited all circulation, 45 the Court did not
distinguish between Lovell v. City of Grif-
fin,4' a prior restraint case, and Schneider v.
State'47 decided only after the Court in
Schneider had engaged in a weighing proc-
ess. This, therefore, may be reasonably con-
strued as a holding that any ordinance that
inhibits the circulation of all books or
pamphlets, regardless of the contents, would
be found to be void without consideration of
the public interest motivating the ordinance.
Such an approach would explain the Court's
failure to mention the Lobbying Act and
second-class mail privilege cases, which did
not involve restrictions as comprehensive as
that in Mishkin and Talley.4 Although it is
otherwise difficult to explain the weight
given to Lovell, it is unlikely that the Court
intended to formulate such a new doctrine
sub silentio, or that it intended to change
its approach to cases like Schneider, in
which the Court's opinion was reached only
43 People v. Mishkin, 17 App. Div. 2d 243, 234
N.Y.S.2d 342 (1st Dep't 1962).
4" Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
45 Id. at 63.
4GSee text accompanying note 11 supra.
4" See text accompanying note 14 supra.
48 The Lobbying Act does not suffer from over-
broadness, since every lobbying activity is relevant
in weighing the political pressures, whereas not
every book or handbill is defamatory, obscene or
fraudulent. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
625 (1954). The act requiring mail identification
was not upheld because of an interest in prevent-
ing the circulation of offensive matter, but rather
because lower postal rates constituted a privilege
to which incidental conditions could be attached.
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288,
314 (1913).
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after a careful weighing of the degree to
which free speech was restricted against the
extent of the public interest motivating the
restriction. This is further confirmed by the
fact that the Mishkin case cited only Talley
and Schneider without mentioning Lovell.
Another possibility is that the Court, in
referring to the earlier cases, is incorporat-
ing the weighing process used in Schneider,
implicitly holding that the blanket restric-
tion in that case is analogous to the identifi-
cation requirement of the instant and Talley
cases, and that there is no more compelling
justification here. In accord with this theory,
it would seem that in cases involving broad
restrictions, the Court requires a very sub-
stantial interest as the justification and that
in the absence of such a compelling interest,
there is no reason for an express weighing
process. This explanation, however, is not
very reasonable in view of the criticism of
the majority opinion in the Talley case by
the concurring and dissenting opinions in
that case which took issue with the major-
ity's failure to weigh the conflicting interests.
Furthermore, the opinion in Lovell, as pre-
viously noted, does not involve a weighing
process.
In expressly declaring that they were not
passing on the validity of an ordinance 49 or
statute50 limited to prevent specific evils, the
opinions in the Mishkin and Talley cases
may be viewed as suggesting that the statutes
were invalidated because there were means
of achieving the purpose of identifying those
responsible for obscene or defamatory pub-
lication which would be less restrictive of
free speech. This would seem to imply a
-UTalley v. California, supra note 44, at 64.
50 People v. Mishkin, supra note 43, at 244, 234
N.Y.S.2d at 344.
weighing of the increased restriction on free
speech inherent in a broad ordinance as com-
pared with a narrower ordinance, against
the increased efficacy in eliminating the evil
which would be provided by a broad ordi-
nance. However, the absence of any indica-
tion that the Court intends to weigh the
relative efficiency and restrictiveness of
varying ordinances against the apparent
difficulty of effectively identifying persons
responsible for the dissemination of defama-
tory or obscene literature by less inclusive
means, suggests that this interpretation is not
likely. Thus, if the Court is requiring a more
limited ordinance when it would be imprac-
tical, and perhaps impossible, to draft one
that will effectively eliminate the undesired
materials, the opinions might be interpreted
as adopting the principle that any restriction
that includes within its purview inoffensive
as well as offensive material is invalid, with-
out regard to the decreased effectiveness or
total ineffectiveness of a more limited ordi-
nance. This analysis, of course, would ex-
plain the Court's failure to discuss the Lob-
bying Act case 1 since that act was not
applicable to any situations not within its
objectives.
Depending on how the Talley and Mish-
kin cases are interpreted, they may cast
doubt on the validity of state statutes requir-
ing identification of campaign materials and
other limited statutes. If the statutes in
Talley and Mishkin were invalidated be-
cause they were applicable to all handbills
and all books,' then the election statutes
may be distinguished on the ground that
they are applicable to a much smaller class
of communication. However, if the Court is
51 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
5L See text accompanying note 48 supra.
invalidating all restrictions on free speech
that include within their scope inoffensive
as well as offensive material, without regard
to the diminished effectiveness of a narrower
statute, then it would seem that these elec-
tion laws are violative of free speech, since
they require identification of all campaign
material, even though the vast majority of it
is not objectionable. If, on the other hand,
the Court's decision is based on some im-
plicit or incorporated weighing process, then
it merely serves to indicate the great im-
portance which is ascribed to anonymity as
an essential element in the exercise of first
amendment rights. Then the election laws
could be upheld by emphasizing the para-
mount public interest in safeguarding the
election process.5 3 This, as well as the possi-
bility that future cases may involve compel-
ling public interests advanced in justification
of laws that control the distribution of inof-
fensive along with offensive material, makes
it desirable that future decisions interpreting
these cases not view them as having elimi-
nated the weighing approach from the law
governing the exercise of first amendment
rights.
The scope of protection of anonymity re-
mains to be seen, since the cases recognizing
it have involved statutes which were exces-
sively broad or disclosure requirements not
reasonably related to the purposes they were
asserted to serve. The main problem in ap-
plying precedents such as Talley and Mish-
kin will be the determination of when
discosure requirements are sufficiently spe-
cific to avoid unconstitutionality. There is
no doubt that the requirement that a person
be identified with his expression is in itself
53 Cf. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 95-96 (1947); Burroughs v. United States, 290
U.S. 534 (1934).
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a substantial restriction on freedom of
speech and press. It is obvious that in a
great many situations, people will speak
anonymously that which they would dare
not utter if thieir identity were known. One
has only to look back into history to see that
anonymous written material has played an
important role in the formation of the politi-
cal ideas and principles of both the United
States and Great Britain. The Federalist of
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay,5 4 the letters
and handbills of Thomas Paine, 55 and the
even now anonymous Letters to Junius 6 are
graphic examples of the value of anony-
mously written materials. The restriction in
the Mishkin case is not necessary to prevent
danger to the state; neither are those con-
cerning libel, false advertising or fraud.
They are already subject to criminal penal-
ties, and it is difficult to see how such a
statute would help prevent obscenity. A per-
son who is anonymously publishing obscen-
ity will not comply with this statute at the
risk of being subjected to greater criminal
penalties. This statute, therefore, merely
increases the penalty on persons convicted
of such acts; an increase which, if necessary,
could be added to the existing penalties for
such crimes without restricting the freedoms
of speech and press as this statute did. Even
if it be argued that there would be compli-
ance with the statute, then undoubtedly,
allowing for the free distribution of anony-
54 These papers not only had much to do with the
eventual adoption of our Constitution, but they
have also been called "the best commentary on
the principles of government which has ever been
written." 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 52
(Ford ed. 1895).
55 For discussion of these works of Paine, see
BLEYER, HISTORY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 90-
93 (1927).
56 For discussion of these writings, see BLEYER,
op. cit. supra note 55, at 23, 79.
 
